2019 |
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Elezov M, Ozhegov R, Goltsman G, Makarov V. Countermeasure against bright-light attack on superconducting nanowire single-photon detector in quantum key distribution. Opt Express. 2019;27(21):30979–88.
Abstract: We present an active anti-latching system for superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors. We experimentally test it against a bright-light attack, previously used to compromise security of quantum key distribution. Although our system detects continuous blinding, the detector is shown to be partially blindable and controllable by specially tailored sequences of bright pulses. Improvements to the countermeasure are suggested.
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2017 |
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Elezov MS, Ozhegov RV, Goltsman GN, Makarov V. Development of the experimental setup for investigation of latching of superconducting single-photon detector caused by blinding attack on the quantum key distribution system. In: EPJ Web of Conferences. Vol 132.; 2017. 2.
Abstract: Recently bright-light control of the SSPD has been
demonstrated. This attack employed a “backdoor†in the detector biasing
scheme. Under bright-light illumination, SSPD becomes resistive and
remains “latched†in the resistive state even when the light is switched off.
While the SSPD is latched, Eve can simulate SSPD single-photon response
by sending strong light pulses, thus deceiving Bob. We developed the
experimental setup for investigation of a dependence on latching threshold
of SSPD on optical pulse length and peak power. By knowing latching
threshold it is possible to understand essential requirements for
development countermeasures against blinding attack on quantum key
distribution system with SSPDs.
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Elezov MS, Ozhegov RV, Goltsman GN, Makarov V, Vinogradov EA, Naumov AV, et al. Development of the experimental setup for investigation of latching of superconducting single-photon detector caused by blinding attack on the quantum key distribution system. In: EPJ Web Conf. Vol 132.; 2017. 01004 (1 to 2).
Abstract: Recently bright-light control of the SSPD has been demonstrated. This attack employed a “backdoor” in the detector biasing scheme. Under bright-light illumination, SSPD becomes resistive and remains “latched” in the resistive state even when the light is switched off. While the SSPD is latched, Eve can simulate SSPD single-photon response by sending strong light pulses, thus deceiving Bob. We developed the experimental setup for investigation of a dependence on latching threshold of SSPD on optical pulse length and peak power. By knowing latching threshold it is possible to understand essential requirements for development countermeasures against blinding attack on quantum key distribution system with SSPDs.
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2015 |
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Elezov MS, Ozhegov RV, Kurochkin YV, Goltsman GN, Makarov VS, Samartsev VV, et al. Countermeasures against blinding attack on superconducting nanowire detectors for QKD. In: EPJ Web Conf. Vol 103.; 2015. 10002 (1 to 2).
Abstract: Nowadays, the superconducting single-photon detectors (SSPDs) are used in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) instead of single-photon avalanche photodiodes. Recently bright-light control of the SSPD has been demonstrated. This attack employed a “backdoor” in the detector biasing technique. We developed the autoreset system which returns the SSPD to superconducting state when it is latched. We investigate latched state of the SSPD and define limit conditions for effective blinding attack. Peculiarity of the blinding attack is a long nonsingle photon response of the SSPD. It is much longer than usual single photon response. Besides, we need follow up response duration of the SSPD. These countermeasures allow us to prevent blind attack on SSPDs for Quantum Key Distribution.
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2011 |
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Wiechers C, Lydersen L, Wittmann C, Elser D, Skaar J, Marquardt C, et al. After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem. New J. Phys.. 2011;13(1):14.
Abstract: We present a method to control the detection events in quantum key distribution systems that use gated single-photon detectors. We employ bright pulses as faked states, timed to arrive at the avalanche photodiodes outside the activation time. The attack can remain unnoticed, since the faked states do not increase the error rate per se. This allows for an intercept-resend attack, where an eavesdropper transfers her detection events to the legitimate receiver without causing any errors. As a side effect, afterpulses, originating from accumulated charge carriers in the detectors, increase the error rate. We have experimentally tested detectors of the system id3110 (Clavis2) from ID Quantique. We identify the parameter regime in which the attack is feasible despite the side effect. Furthermore, we outline how simple modifications in the implementation can make the device immune to this attack.
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