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Ekström, H., Kroug, M., Belitsky, V., Kollberg, E., Olsson, H., Goltsman, G., et al. (1996). Hot electron mixers for THz applications. In E. J. Rolfe, & G. Pilbratt (Eds.), Proc. 30th ESLAB (pp. 207–210).
Abstract: We have measured the noise performance of 35 A thin NbN HEB devices integrated with spiral antennas on antireflection coated silicon substrate lenses at 620 GHz. From the noise measurements we have determined a total conversion gain of the receiver of—16 dB, and an intrinsic conversion of about-10 dB. The IF bandwidth of the 35 A thick NbN devices is at least 3 GHz. The DSB receiver noise temperature is less than 1450 K. Without mismatch losses, which is possible to obtain with a shorter device, and with reduced loss from the beamsplitter, we expect to achieve a DSB receiver noise temperature of less ‘than 700 K.
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Elantev, A. I., & Karasik, B. S. (1994). Noise temperature of a superconducting hot-electron mixer. In Proc. 5th Int. Symp. Space Terahertz Technol. (225).
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Eletskii, A. V., Sarychev, A. K., Boginskaya, I. A., Bocharov, G. S., Gaiduchenko, I. A., Egin, M. S., et al. (2018). Amplification of a Raman scattering signal by carbon nanotubes. Dokl. Phys., 63(12), 496–498.
Abstract: The effect of Raman scattering (RLS) signal amplification by carbon nanotubes (CNTs) was studied. Single-layered nanotubes were synthesized by the chemical vapor deposition (CVD) method using methane as a carbon-containing gas. The object of study used was water, the Raman spectrum of which is rather well known. Amplification of the Raman scattering signal by several hundred percent was attained in our work. The maximum amplification of a Raman scattering signal was shown to be achieved at an optimal density of nanotubes on a substrate. This effect was due to the scattering and screening of plasmons excited in CNTs by neighboring nanotubes. The amplification mechanism and the possibilities of optimization for this effect were discussed on the basis of the theory of plasmon resonance in carbon nanotubes.
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Elezov, M. S., Ozhegov, R. V., Goltsman, G. N., Makarov, V., Vinogradov, E. A., Naumov, A. V., et al. (2017). Development of the experimental setup for investigation of latching of superconducting single-photon detector caused by blinding attack on the quantum key distribution system. In EPJ Web Conf. (Vol. 132, 01004 (1 to 2)).
Abstract: Recently bright-light control of the SSPD has been demonstrated. This attack employed a “backdoor” in the detector biasing scheme. Under bright-light illumination, SSPD becomes resistive and remains “latched” in the resistive state even when the light is switched off. While the SSPD is latched, Eve can simulate SSPD single-photon response by sending strong light pulses, thus deceiving Bob. We developed the experimental setup for investigation of a dependence on latching threshold of SSPD on optical pulse length and peak power. By knowing latching threshold it is possible to understand essential requirements for development countermeasures against blinding attack on quantum key distribution system with SSPDs.
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Elezov, M. S., Ozhegov, R. V., Kurochkin, Y. V., Goltsman, G. N., Makarov, V. S., Samartsev, V. V., et al. (2015). Countermeasures against blinding attack on superconducting nanowire detectors for QKD. In EPJ Web Conf. (Vol. 103, 10002 (1 to 2)).
Abstract: Nowadays, the superconducting single-photon detectors (SSPDs) are used in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) instead of single-photon avalanche photodiodes. Recently bright-light control of the SSPD has been demonstrated. This attack employed a “backdoor” in the detector biasing technique. We developed the autoreset system which returns the SSPD to superconducting state when it is latched. We investigate latched state of the SSPD and define limit conditions for effective blinding attack. Peculiarity of the blinding attack is a long nonsingle photon response of the SSPD. It is much longer than usual single photon response. Besides, we need follow up response duration of the SSPD. These countermeasures allow us to prevent blind attack on SSPDs for Quantum Key Distribution.
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