|
|
Zinoni, C., Alloing, B., Li, L. H., Marsili, F., Fiore, A., Lunghi, L., et al. (2007). Single-photon experiments at telecommunication wavelengths using nanowire superconducting detectors. Appl. Phys. Lett., 91(3), 031106 (1 to 3).
Abstract: The authors report fiber-coupled superconducting single-photon detectors with specifications that exceed those of avalanche photodiodes, operating at telecommunication wavelength, in sensitivity, temporal resolution, and repetition frequency. The improved performance is demonstrated by measuring the intensity correlation function g(2)(τ) of single-photon states at 1300nm produced by single semiconductor quantum dots.
This work was supported by Swiss National Foundation through the “Professeur borsier” and NCCR Quantum Photonics program, FP6 STREP “SINPHONIA” (Contract No. NMP4-CT-2005-16433), IP “QAP” (Contract No. 15848), NOE “ePIXnet,” and the Italian MIUR-FIRB program.
|
|
|
|
Lydersen, L., Wiechers, C., Wittmann, C., Elser, D., Skaar, J., & Makarov, V. (2010). Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography. Opt. Express, 18(26), 27938–27954.
Abstract: It has previously been shown that the gated detectors of two commercially available quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are blindable and controllable by an eavesdropper using continuous-wave illumination and short bright trigger pulses, manipulating voltages in the circuit [L. Lydersen et al., Nat. Photonics DOI:10.1038/nphoton.2010.214]. This allows for an attack eavesdropping the full raw and secret key without increasing the quantum bit error rate (QBER). Here we show how thermal effects in detectors under bright illumination can lead to the same outcome. We demonstrate that the detectors in a commercial QKD system Clavis2 can be blinded by heating the avalanche photo diodes (APDs) using bright illumination, so-called thermal blinding. Further, the detectors can be triggered using short bright pulses once they are blind. For systems with pauses between packet transmission such as the plug-and-play systems, thermal inertia enables Eve to apply the bright blinding illumination before eavesdropping, making her more difficult to catch.
|
|
|
|
Zhang, Z., Zhang, J., Wu, L., Zhang, Y., Zhao, Y., & Su, J. (2013). Photon-counting chirped amplitude modulation lidar using a smart premixing method. Opt. Lett., 38(21), 4389–4392.
Abstract: We proposed a new premixing method for photon-counting chirped amplitude modulation lidar (PCCAML). Earlier studies used the counting results of the returned signal detected by a Geiger mode avalanche photodiode detector (Gm-APD) to mix with the reference signal, called the postmixing method. We use an alternative method known as the premixing method, in which the reference signal is used to directly modulate the sampling gate width of the Gm-APD, and the mixing of the returned signal and the reference signal is completed before the Gm-APD. This premixing method is more flexible and may perform better than the postmixing method in terms of signal-to-noise ratio by cutting down a separated mixer commonly used in the postmixing lidar system. Furthermore, this premixing method lowers the demand for the sampling frequency of the Gm-APD. It allows the use of a much wider modulation bandwidth to improve the range accuracy and resolution. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first report to use the premixing method in the PCCAML system, which will benefit future lidar applications.
|
|
|
|
Seki, T., Shibata, H., Takesue, H., Tokura, Y., & Imoto, N. (2010). Comparison of timing jitter between NbN superconducting single-photon detector and avalanche photodiode. Phys. C, 470(20), 1534–1537.
Abstract: We report the pulse-to-pulse timing jitter measurement of a niobium nitride (NbN) superconducting single-photon detector (SSPD) and an InGaAs avalanche photodiode (APD) at 1550-nm wavelength. A direct comparison of their timing jitter was performed by using the same experimental configuration to measure both detectors. The measured jitter of the SSPD and the APD are 75 and 84 ps at full-width at half-maximum (FWHM), and 138 and 384 ps at full-width at tenth-maximum (FWTM), respectively. The jitter of the SSPD remains small at FWTM while that of APD is wide. We also estimated the transmission distances and secure key generation rates for fiber-based quantum key distribution (QKD) which uses these detectors. The estimated transmission distances of the APD are 86 km and 107 km with respect to 1 ns and 100 ps time windows, respectively, and those of the SSPD are 125 km and 172 km with respect to 1 ns and 100 ps time windows, respectively. This estimation indicates the SSPDЃfs advantages for QKD compared to the APD.
|
|
|
|
Lydersen, L., Wiechers, C., Wittmann, C., Elser, D., Skaar, J., & Makarov, V. (2010). Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by tailored bright illumination. Nat. Photon., 4(10), 686–689.
Abstract: The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics allow two remote parties to communicate a private, secret key, which is protected from eavesdropping by the laws of physics. So-called quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations always rely on detectors to measure the relevant quantum property of single photons. Here we demonstrate experimentally that the detectors in two commercially available QKD systems can be fully remote-controlled using specially tailored bright illumination. This makes it possible to tracelessly acquire the full secret key; we propose an eavesdropping apparatus built of off-the-shelf components. The loophole is likely to be present in most QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes to detect single photons. We believe that our findings are crucial for strengthening the security of practical QKD, by identifying and patching technological deficiencies.
|
|
|
|
Wiechers, C., Lydersen, L., Wittmann, C., Elser, D., Skaar, J., Marquardt, C., et al. (2011). After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem. New J. Phys., 13(1), 14.
Abstract: We present a method to control the detection events in quantum key distribution systems that use gated single-photon detectors. We employ bright pulses as faked states, timed to arrive at the avalanche photodiodes outside the activation time. The attack can remain unnoticed, since the faked states do not increase the error rate per se. This allows for an intercept-resend attack, where an eavesdropper transfers her detection events to the legitimate receiver without causing any errors. As a side effect, afterpulses, originating from accumulated charge carriers in the detectors, increase the error rate. We have experimentally tested detectors of the system id3110 (Clavis2) from ID Quantique. We identify the parameter regime in which the attack is feasible despite the side effect. Furthermore, we outline how simple modifications in the implementation can make the device immune to this attack.
|
|
