Esteban, E., & Serna, H. (2009). Quantum key distribution protocol with private-public key. arXiv, , 3.
Abstract: A quantum cryptographic protocol based in public key cryptography combinations and private key cryptography is presented. Unlike the BB84 protocol 1 and its many variants 2,3 two quantum channels are used. The present research does not make reconciliation mechanisms of information to derive the key. A three related system of key distribution are described.
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Elezov, M. S., Ozhegov, R. V., Goltsman, G. N., Makarov, V., Vinogradov, E. A., Naumov, A. V., et al. (2017). Development of the experimental setup for investigation of latching of superconducting single-photon detector caused by blinding attack on the quantum key distribution system. In EPJ Web Conf. (Vol. 132, 01004 (1 to 2)).
Abstract: Recently bright-light control of the SSPD has been demonstrated. This attack employed a “backdoor” in the detector biasing scheme. Under bright-light illumination, SSPD becomes resistive and remains “latched” in the resistive state even when the light is switched off. While the SSPD is latched, Eve can simulate SSPD single-photon response by sending strong light pulses, thus deceiving Bob. We developed the experimental setup for investigation of a dependence on latching threshold of SSPD on optical pulse length and peak power. By knowing latching threshold it is possible to understand essential requirements for development countermeasures against blinding attack on quantum key distribution system with SSPDs.
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Elezov, M. S., Ozhegov, R. V., Kurochkin, Y. V., Goltsman, G. N., Makarov, V. S., Samartsev, V. V., et al. (2015). Countermeasures against blinding attack on superconducting nanowire detectors for QKD. In EPJ Web Conf. (Vol. 103, 10002 (1 to 2)).
Abstract: Nowadays, the superconducting single-photon detectors (SSPDs) are used in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) instead of single-photon avalanche photodiodes. Recently bright-light control of the SSPD has been demonstrated. This attack employed a “backdoor” in the detector biasing technique. We developed the autoreset system which returns the SSPD to superconducting state when it is latched. We investigate latched state of the SSPD and define limit conditions for effective blinding attack. Peculiarity of the blinding attack is a long nonsingle photon response of the SSPD. It is much longer than usual single photon response. Besides, we need follow up response duration of the SSPD. These countermeasures allow us to prevent blind attack on SSPDs for Quantum Key Distribution.
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Scheel, S. (2009). Single-photon sources–an introduction. J. Modern Opt., 56(2-3), 141–160.
Abstract: This review surveys the physical principles and recent developments in manufacturing single-photon sources. Special emphasis is placed on important potential applications such as linear optical quantum computing (LOQC), quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum metrology that drive the development of these sources of single photons. We discuss the quantum-mechanical properties of light prepared in a quantum state of definite photon number and compare it with coherent light that shows a Poissonian distribution of photon numbers. We examine how the single-photon fidelity directly influences the ability to transmit secure quantum bits over a predefined distance. The theoretical description of modified spontaneous decay, the main principle behind single-photon generation, provides the background for many experimental implementations such as those using microresonators or pillar microcavities. The main alternative way to generate single photons using postselection of entangled photon pairs from parametric down-conversion, will be discussed. We concentrate on describing the underlying physical principles and we will point out limitations and open problems associated with single-photon production.
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Takesue, H., Nam, S. W., Zhang, Q., Hadfield, R. H., Honjo, T., Tamaki, K., et al. (2007). Quantum key distribution over a 40-dB channel loss using superconducting single-photon detectors. Nat. Photon., 1, 343–348.
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