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Author (up) Elezov, M. S.; Ozhegov, R. V.; Goltsman, G. N.; Makarov, V.
Title Development of the experimental setup for investigation of latching of superconducting single-photon detector caused by blinding attack on the quantum key distribution system Type Conference Article
Year 2017 Publication EPJ Web of Conferences Abbreviated Journal EPJ Web of Conferences
Volume 132 Issue 2 Pages 2
Keywords
Abstract Recently bright-light control of the SSPD has been

demonstrated. This attack employed a “backdoor” in the detector biasing

scheme. Under bright-light illumination, SSPD becomes resistive and

remains “latched” in the resistive state even when the light is switched off.

While the SSPD is latched, Eve can simulate SSPD single-photon response

by sending strong light pulses, thus deceiving Bob. We developed the

experimental setup for investigation of a dependence on latching threshold

of SSPD on optical pulse length and peak power. By knowing latching

threshold it is possible to understand essential requirements for

development countermeasures against blinding attack on quantum key

distribution system with SSPDs.
Address
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes Approved no
Call Number RPLAB @ kovalyuk @ Serial 1116
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Author (up) Elezov, M. S.; Ozhegov, R. V.; Goltsman, G. N.; Makarov, V.; Vinogradov, E. A.; Naumov, A. V.; Gladush, M. G.; Karimullin, K. R.
Title Development of the experimental setup for investigation of latching of superconducting single-photon detector caused by blinding attack on the quantum key distribution system Type Conference Article
Year 2017 Publication EPJ Web Conf. Abbreviated Journal EPJ Web Conf.
Volume 132 Issue Pages 01004 (1 to 2)
Keywords QKD, SSPD, SNSPD
Abstract Recently bright-light control of the SSPD has been demonstrated. This attack employed a “backdoor” in the detector biasing scheme. Under bright-light illumination, SSPD becomes resistive and remains “latched” in the resistive state even when the light is switched off. While the SSPD is latched, Eve can simulate SSPD single-photon response by sending strong light pulses, thus deceiving Bob. We developed the experimental setup for investigation of a dependence on latching threshold of SSPD on optical pulse length and peak power. By knowing latching threshold it is possible to understand essential requirements for development countermeasures against blinding attack on quantum key distribution system with SSPDs.
Address
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 2100-014X ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes Approved no
Call Number Serial 1327
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Author (up) Elezov, M. S.; Ozhegov, R. V.; Kurochkin, Y. V.; Goltsman, G. N.; Makarov, V. S.; Samartsev, V. V.; Vinogradov, E. A.; Naumov, A. V.; Karimullin, K. R.
Title Countermeasures against blinding attack on superconducting nanowire detectors for QKD Type Conference Article
Year 2015 Publication EPJ Web Conf. Abbreviated Journal EPJ Web Conf.
Volume 103 Issue Pages 10002 (1 to 2)
Keywords SSPD, SNSPD, QKD
Abstract Nowadays, the superconducting single-photon detectors (SSPDs) are used in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) instead of single-photon avalanche photodiodes. Recently bright-light control of the SSPD has been demonstrated. This attack employed a “backdoor” in the detector biasing technique. We developed the autoreset system which returns the SSPD to superconducting state when it is latched. We investigate latched state of the SSPD and define limit conditions for effective blinding attack. Peculiarity of the blinding attack is a long nonsingle photon response of the SSPD. It is much longer than usual single photon response. Besides, we need follow up response duration of the SSPD. These countermeasures allow us to prevent blind attack on SSPDs for Quantum Key Distribution.
Address
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 2100-014X ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes Approved no
Call Number Serial 1352
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Author (up) Elezov, M.; Ozhegov, R.; Goltsman, G.; Makarov, V.
Title Countermeasure against bright-light attack on superconducting nanowire single-photon detector in quantum key distribution Type Journal Article
Year 2019 Publication Opt. Express Abbreviated Journal Opt. Express
Volume 27 Issue 21 Pages 30979-30988
Keywords SSPD, SNSPD
Abstract We present an active anti-latching system for superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors. We experimentally test it against a bright-light attack, previously used to compromise security of quantum key distribution. Although our system detects continuous blinding, the detector is shown to be partially blindable and controllable by specially tailored sequences of bright pulses. Improvements to the countermeasure are suggested.
Address
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1094-4087 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes PMID:31684339 Approved no
Call Number Serial 1275
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Author (up) Wiechers, C.; Lydersen, L.; Wittmann, C.; Elser, D.; Skaar, J.; Marquardt, Ch; Makarov, V.; Leuchs, G.
Title After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem Type Journal Article
Year 2011 Publication New J. Phys. Abbreviated Journal
Volume 13 Issue 1 Pages 14
Keywords quantum cryptography; hacking; interception; attack; SPD; APD; QKD
Abstract We present a method to control the detection events in quantum key distribution systems that use gated single-photon detectors. We employ bright pulses as faked states, timed to arrive at the avalanche photodiodes outside the activation time. The attack can remain unnoticed, since the faked states do not increase the error rate per se. This allows for an intercept-resend attack, where an eavesdropper transfers her detection events to the legitimate receiver without causing any errors. As a side effect, afterpulses, originating from accumulated charge carriers in the detectors, increase the error rate. We have experimentally tested detectors of the system id3110 (Clavis2) from ID Quantique. We identify the parameter regime in which the attack is feasible despite the side effect. Furthermore, we outline how simple modifications in the implementation can make the device immune to this attack.
Address
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes Approved no
Call Number RPLAB @ gujma @ Serial 730
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