Abstract: The monolithic integration of single-photon sources, passive optical circuits, and single-photon detectors enables complex and scalable quantum photonic integrated circuits, for application in linear-optics quantum computing and quantum communications. Here, we demonstrate a key component of such a circuit, a waveguide single-photon detector. Our detectors, based on superconducting nanowires on GaAs ridge waveguides, provide high efficiency (~0%) at telecom wavelengths, high timing accuracy (~0 ps), and response time in the ns range and are fully compatible with the integration of single-photon sources, passive networks, and modulators.

Abstract: Several competing technologies continue to advance the field of terahertz science; of particular importance has been the development of a terahertz semiconductor quantum cascade laser (QCL), which is arguably the only solid-state terahertz source with average optical power levels of much greater than a milliwatt. Terahertz QCLs are required to be cryogenically cooled and improvement of their temperature performance is the single most important research goal in the field. Thus far, their maximum operating temperature has been empirically limited to ~planckω/kB, a largely inexplicable trend that has bred speculation that a room-temperature terahertz QCL may not be possible in materials used at present. Here, we argue that this behaviour is an indirect consequence of the resonant-tunnelling injection mechanism employed in all previously reported terahertz QCLs. We demonstrate a new scattering-assisted injection scheme to surpass this limit for a 1.8-THz QCL that operates up to ~1.9planckω/kB (163 K). Peak optical power in excess of 2 mW was detected from the laser at 155 K. This development should make QCL technology attractive for applications below 2 THz, and initiate new design strategies for realizing a room-temperature terahertz semiconductor laser.

Abstract: We present a method to control the detection events in quantum key distribution systems that use gated single-photon detectors. We employ bright pulses as faked states, timed to arrive at the avalanche photodiodes outside the activation time. The attack can remain unnoticed, since the faked states do not increase the error rate per se. This allows for an intercept-resend attack, where an eavesdropper transfers her detection events to the legitimate receiver without causing any errors. As a side effect, afterpulses, originating from accumulated charge carriers in the detectors, increase the error rate. We have experimentally tested detectors of the system id3110 (Clavis2) from ID Quantique. We identify the parameter regime in which the attack is feasible despite the side effect. Furthermore, we outline how simple modifications in the implementation can make the device immune to this attack.